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11. Introduction
In the last few decades, the industrialised nations of Europe have been subjected to a variety
of external and policy-induced demand shocks while simultaneously experiencing significant
changes in their labour productivity and employment.  Meanwhile, it has been recognised that
persistent involuntary unemployment gives rise to externalities that could be exploited by
economic agents.  For example, price-setting firms could use rising unemployment as device
to deter shirking.  In this setting, macroeconomic policy interventions can produce
unexpected consequences.  For example, as Lindbeck (1992) points out: "In the context of a
nonmarket-clearing labour market, it is certainly reasonable to regard unemployment, in
particular highly persistent unemployment, as a major macroeconomic distortion.  There is
therefore a potential case for policy actions, provided such actions do not create more
problems than they solve. Experience in many countries suggests that the latter reservation is
not trivial."  To more fully explore the extent to which these concerns are warranted, we
construct a stylised general equilibrium model to show the conditions under which demand
led expansions, which lead to changes in labour productivity, may have perverse effects on
unemployment.  Additionally, we provide some evidence, for a number of European
countries, which suggests that Lindbeck’s concerns are, indeed, not without empirical
foundation.
Recent examples of related theoretical research, which examines the link between
European unemployment and productivity, include Malley and Moutos (2001), Leith and Li
(2000),  Daveri and Tabellini (2000), Blanchard (1998), Caballero and Hammour  (1998a,b),
Gordon (1997) and Manning (1992)).  However, none of these studies explores the general
equilibrium implications for unemployment of demand shocks in the presence of both labour
and product market imperfections.  On the empirical side, a large number of studies have
examined the behaviour of labour productivity in the industrialised countries and provide
indisputable evidence regarding the way in which labour productivity has changed over the
last few decades. Recent examples include Disney, et al. (2000), Barnes and Haskel (2000),
Marini and Scaramozzino (2000), Bart van Ark et al. (2000) and Sala-i-Martin (1996).  The
evidence provided in these studies is usually interpreted using one of the micro-based
explanations underlying the behaviour of labour productivity.  These may, in general, be
divided into two categories.  The first concentrates on the productivity gains that can be
realised through: i) increased skill due to training; ii) increased efficiency due to progress in
management and restructuring; and iii) increased physical productivity of other factors of
2production due to R&D, etc..  The second category emphasises market forces and sees
competition and market selection as the main motivation behind the rise in efficiency.  The
separating line between these two accounts is not very clear in the sense that the latter will
have to be achieved through the former when the economy is operating efficiently.  However,
if the economy happens to be in an inefficient phase, market forces can act directly without
having to induce any of the factors in the first category.   The efficiency wage hypothesis is a
typical example of this case and will be used in this paper to illustrate the point.
To provide the intuition for the role of efficiency wages in this context, consider an
equilibrium that sustains involuntary unemployment and further suppose that the existence of
the latter persuades the employed to work harder.  In this case, because there is a causal
relationship between the level of unemployment and the productivity of the employed, a total
change in output can be decomposed into changes due to employment and productivity.  As a
result, a sufficient condition for an expansionary demand shock to raise both output and
employment is that the resulting fall in unemployment does not induce a fall in productivity
of the employed to such an extent that it eliminates the effect of the rise in employment.
Defining aggregate labour productivity as q=Y/L where Y, L and q respectively denote output,
employment and productivity, and noting that dq=(dY-qdL)/L, it is clear that any of the six
cases outlined in Table 1 could, in principle, occur in the aggregate (see Barnes and Haskel,
2000, for evidence at plant level).
Table 1. Simultaneous Changes in Labour Productivity,
Output and Employment
Change in
Labour
Productivity
Change in
Employment
Change in
Output
Change in
Unemployment
Rate
dL<0 dY>0 du>0
dL>0 dY>0 du<0
Rising
Productivity
dq>0 dL<0 dY<0 du>0
dL>0 dY<0 du<0
dL<0 dY<0 du>0
Falling
Productivity
dq<0 dL>0 dY>0 du<0
The last column of Table 1 shows the implied changes in the unemployment rate
(based on the approximation that the labour force is constant).  This discussion clearly
suggests that it is a distinct possibility that output and unemployment can both fall or rise
simultaneously.  While the cases in which changes in output and unemployment have
3opposite signs can be easily explained by a variety of standard theories, a convincing
macroeconomic theory capable of predicting why these variables both fall or rise
simultaneously is more elusive1.  To obtain a more realistic indication of whether output and
unemployment simultaneously move in the same direction, in Table 2 we examine quarterly
data for a cross section of 10 European countries, chosen to reflect a wide range industrial
structures as well as macroeconomic and labour market experiences over the last few decades.
Table 2.  Directions of Quarterly Changes in Output, Y, & Unemployment Rate, u;
(occurrences as percentage of  the sample size, n)
C
o
u
ntry
Sam
ple
dY
t-4 >0 &
 du
t >0
a
nd
dY
t-4 <0 &
 du
t <0
dY
t-2 >0 &
 du
t >0
a
nd
dY
t-2 <0 &
 du
t <0
dY
t >0 &
 du
t >0
a
nd
dY
t
 <0 &
 du
t <0
dY
t+2 >0 &
 du
t >0
a
nd
dY
t+2 <0 &
 du
t <0
dY
t+4 >0 &
 du
t >0
a
nd
dY
t+4 <0 &
 du
t <0
BEL 60:2-97:4
(n=151)
0.456 0.423 0.417 0.423 0.463
DEU 60:2-89:4
(n=119)
0.461 0.385 0.345 0.402 0.461
ESP 61:1-98:4
(n=152)
0.493 0.500 0.480 0.473 0.493
FRA 65:1-97:4
(n=132)
0.609 0.592 0.553 0.638 0.656
GBR 60:2-98:3
(n=154)
0.433 0.414 0.370 0.461 0.547
IRE 60:2-97:4
(n=151)
0.497 0.463 0.430 0.450 0.456
ITA 60:2-98:3
(n=154)
0.487 0.559 0.513 0.546 0.560
NLD 69:2-97:4
(n=115)
0.414 0.416 0.400 0.416 0.414
PRT 60:2-97:4
(n=151)
0.578 0.597 0.629 0.671 0.694
SWE 60:2-98:3
(n=154)
0.473 0.342 0.357 0.467 0.460
The number of observations, n, and the sample period correspond to the
contemporaneous changes in the natural logarithm of real GDP (market prices), Y,
and the unemployment rate, u. Based on a one-sample 2-tailed t-test the mean
number occurrences of (dYt±s>0 & dut>0) and (dYt±s<0 & dut<0) are significantly
different from zero at the 0.01 level of significance. This result also holds across all
leads and lags. Belgium (BEL), West Germany (DEU), Spain (ESP), France (FRA),
UK (GBR), Ireland (IRE), Italy (ITA), Netherlands (NLD), Portugal (PRT), Sweden
(SWE); Y and u are obtained from the OECD Business Sector Database.
                                                
1
  Note that theories of creative destruction (see e.g. Aghion and Howitt, 1992, 1994) are also capable of
predicting that output and unemployment simultaneously move in the same direction. However, if the periods
in which output and unemployment are positively related occur on a systematic basis, these theories are
lacking since the impulse mechanisms which ignite the creative destruction process are either product or
process innovation and by their very nature these are random occurrences.
4Table 2 shows the directions of quarterly changes as a proportion of the entire sample
for which changes in output and unemployment have the same sign, i.e.
]0du&0dY[ tst >>±  and ]0du&0dY[ tst <<±  for s=0,2,4.  These results indicate that for
a substantial and statistically significant proportion of the sample (i.e. at least 35% of the
sample for all countries) the sign combinations show output and unemployment moving in
the same direction.  It is also clear from Table 2 that these findings hold not only for
contemporaneous changes but also for lagged and led changes2.   Regarding the latter, the
proportion of periods where Y and u are positively related increases for virtually all other
cases considered3.  Given the results in Table 2, it seems fair to conclude that theories
disregarding this possibility – by employing models with market structures which are only
capable of generating the prediction that Y and u are negatively related – can only be of
limited use when analysing the potential effects of macroeconomic policy.
There are already a number of studies that analyse the macroeconomic effects of
labour market imperfections. The interested reader may consult, for instance, Danthine and
Donaldson (1990), Dixon (1990), Moutos (1991), Hoon and Phelps (1992), Fender and Yip
(1993), Phelps (1994) and Dixon and Rankin (1995) where the latter also provides a survey.
This paper diverges from the these studies by focusing on deriving an equilibrium
relationship between output and unemployment, which is consistent with the evidence
presented in Table 2, and examining the effect of demand shocks in a model that embodies
such a relationship. An important policy insight that emerges from this paper is that an
exogenous stimulation of aggregate demand can only raise output and reduce unemployment
provided the economy is operating relatively efficiently. The intuition for this lies in the
supply side nonlinearities, which could give rise to multiple equilibria in the long run.  We
show that when an economy is trapped in an inefficient equilibrium, positive demand shocks
can lead, perversely, to an increase in unemployment.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the production side –
consisting of monopolistically competitive firms setting prices and offering efficiency wages
to maximise profits – and derives a nonlinear equilibrium relationship between output and
unemployment which is consistent with the evidence reported above.  We also provide further
                                                
2
  We have also examined (dYt ± s, dut) for s = 2, 4, to allow for cyclical changes.
3
  In the empirical analysis, which follows in Section 2, we will concentrate on the contemporaneous case only
since this case clearly does not over-record the proportion of periods when Y and u are moving in the same
direction.
5evidence to show that the main predictions of the model hold for a number of European
countries (i.e. unemployment and output are positively related when unemployment is low
and inversely related when unemployment is high).  Section 3 outlines the demand side –
comprising a representative household and a government, as in the typical models of
imperfect competition – and obtains a conventional aggregate demand function. Section 4
shows that, given the aggregate demand and supply functions, in principle different types of
equilibria could emerge, which do not exclude multiple equilibria. The main distinction
between these equilibria, apart from their stability properties, is related to the level of labour
productivity. This enables us to rank them as ‘efficient’ and ‘inefficient’.  Section 5 concludes
the paper.
2. Production and Aggregate Supply
The supply side is assumed to be populated by N monopolistically competitive firms each
producing a distinct variety of a horizontally differentiated good.  The demand function
facing firm j is






=
−
N
Y
P
P
y
s
j
j ,              (1)
where j is the index denoting firms/products, j∈[0,N], s>1 is the (constant) elasticity of
substitution between any two varieties, P and Y are the aggregate price and quantity CES
indices, Pj is price of variety j and yj is the corresponding quantity demanded and consist of
the private and public demand for the variety produced by firm j.  Denoting the latter by cj
and gj, respectively, we have jjj gcy +=  at the firm level and Y = C + G in the aggregate.
Following the existing literature on monopolistic competition4, we assume that public and
private goods are similar CES bundles and that the government pays the same price as private
consumers. Hence,
( )
)]s/1(1/[1
Nj
)s/1(1
j
s/1 djxNX
−
∈
−
−




= ∫ ,   (2)
                                                
4
  We follow the existing studies in assuming that G and C are similar CES bundles. See Startz (1989), Dixon
and Lawler (1996), Heijdra and Van der Ploeg (1996) and Heijdra, et al. (1998) for further details.
6where xj= cj, gj and  X=C, G. As a result, total expenditure satisfies the following
( ) PYdjyP
Nj
jj =∫
∈
,  (3)
and
( )
)s1/(1
Nj
s1
j djPN
1P
−
∈
−




= ∫ .  (4)
Labour is assumed to be the only factor of production, and to be perfectly mobile
between firms. Each firm j uses an increasing returns technology
φ−= jjj Ley ,              (5)
where jL  is the variable labour input, ej is labour productivity and φ is a constant parameter
reflecting the fixed cost of production5.  We assume that ej is determined by the workers’
attitude towards shirking and represents their optimal effort supply function which depends
on: i) the real wage paid by the firm wj = Wj/P; ii) the extent of unemployment in the
economy captured by the unemployment rate6 u; and iii) the real value of the reservation wage
b=B/P.  The latter is determined by the unemployment benefit, which the government would
pay an unemployed worker.  Thus, we postulate the following effort supply function for a
worker employed by firm j
ej = e(wj,u,b),                (6)
which is assumed to satisfy ′ = > ′ = > ′ = <e
e
w
e
e
u
e
e
bjw
j
j
ju
j
jb
j∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂0 0 0, , ,  and to have
plausible second and cross partial derivatives.  In particular, we shall assume
′′ = <e
e
w
jww
j
j
∂
∂
2
2 0 , ′′ = <e
e
u w
juw
j
j
∂
∂ ∂
2
0  and ′′ = >e
e
b wjbw
j
j
∂
∂ ∂
2
0 .  An example of this type of the
effort function is explicitly derived in the appendix.
                                                
5
  The falling average cost therefore gives rise to the incentive for full specialisation from which a one-to-one
correspondence between the number of varieties and the number of firms in the market will result.
6
 Given that the number of households is normalised to 1, u is simply the proportion of unemployed households.
7Each firm j takes u, B, and the price level P, as given and chooses its ‘efficiency
wage’ jW  and its price jP  so as to maximise its profit
jjjjj LWyP −=π ,              (7)
subject to the demand function in (1) and the production function in (5) as well as taking
account of its workers’ reaction to the choice of Wj which is given by the effort function in
(6).  The first order conditions are ∂ π ∂j jW/ = 0  and ∂ π ∂j jP/ = 0  whose solution imply
the following wage and price setting rules
W
e
e
W
j
j
j
j
= ∂
∂
,              (8)
j
j
j
e
W
1s
sP 


−
= .              (9)
Equation (8) is the well-known result – in the efficiency wage hypothesis literature – that
implies a firm raises its efficiency wage and moves up the effort function until its elasticity
with respect to wage becomes unity.  Equation (9) is the usual mark-up pricing rule for a
monoplistically competitive firm.
In a symmetric equilibrium where all firms are identical these equations can be written
as ewew =⋅′  and we σ= , where σ = s/(s-1) and the subscript j is dropped.  To see the
implication of these, we first note that together these yield σ=′ )b,u,w(ew >1.  Totally
differentiating w)b,u,w(e σ=  and taking account of σ=′we  implies
du
db
e
e
b
u
= −
′
′
>0,               (10)
which shows that an increase in the benefit rate raises the unemployment rate.  Totally
differentiating σ=′ )b,u,w(ew  and using (10) to eliminate db yields
dw
du
e
e
e
e
e
e
bw
ww
u
b
uw
bw
=
′′
′′



 ⋅
′
′



 −
′′
′′





	



,
8which can be re-written as
dw
du
e
w e
e
e w
e
e w
u
ww
bw
b
uw
u
= −
′
⋅ ′′



 ⋅ −
′′
′



 − −
′′
′





	


/ /
.            (11)
Under the assumptions made, − ′
⋅ ′′
e
w e
u
ww
, −
′′
′
e
e w
uw
u /
 and − ′′
′
e
e w
bw
b /
 are all positive and the latter
two ratios are the real wage elasticities of ′eu and ′eb , respectively.  Thus i) a rise in the
unemployment rate will correspond to a fall (rise) in the real wage rate if ′eu  is more (less)
elastic than ′eb  with respect w; and ii) a change in the unemployment rate will have no impact
on the wage rate if ′eu and ′eb  show the same relative response with respect to a change in w.
We can use the above results to examine the way equilibrium output and
unemployment are related to each other on the supply side.  The symmetric long-run
equilibrium of the industry is obtained when entry eliminates profits, WLPYdj
Nj
j −== ∫
∈
πΠ
where ∫
∈
=
Nj
jdjLL  is total employment.  Thus, through free entry and exit process N adjusts to
ensure Π=0, which can be solved to obtain Y = wL, which, given that we σ= , in turn implies
eL1Y
σ
= .            (12)
Equation (12) may be interpreted as a ‘quasi-aggregate’ production function. It traces
the combinations of aggregate employment and output (L,Y) which satisfy the supply side
equilibrium in which labour productivity is determined by an effort supply function and firms
pay wages to induces workers to supply the effort level that maximises their profit.  Or, put
differently, these combinations give the equilibrium locus that describes how Y changes as
firms respond to changes in u while adjusting wages to ensure the resulting effort supply
maximises their profit.
Normalising labour force to unity implies L+u=1.  Taking account of this and
recalling that e = σw and hence de = σ dw, total differentiation of (12) can be used to obtain


 



 −
−=
du
dw
w
u
u
u11w
dL
dY
,            (13)
9which can be used to determine the shape of (12) in (L,Y) space. Provided that dw/du is finite
as 1u → , we would expect the right-hand-side of (13) to be positive for sufficiently large
levels of u.  Conversely, starting from very low levels of u, we would expect the right-hand-
side of (13) to be negative as long as dw/du is positive and w is sufficiently elastic with
respect to u (see discussion under (11)).  Given these and assuming that dw/du is continuous
in u, the equilibrium locus in (L,Y) space may be depicted as in Figure 1.
Figure 1.  The equilibrium relationship between aggregate output and employment
with efficiency wages and monopolistic competition
  Y
 Y
1Y
  L=0                            lL                                         L                       hL    L→1
  u=1                            hu                                         u                       lu     u→0
The shape in Figure 1 is capable of generating all the combinations outlined in Table 1
regarding the possible signs of dY and du.  A clear prediction from Figure 1 is that
unemployment and output, in the aggregate, are positively related when unemployment is
low, and are inversely related when unemployment is high. Provided that observed, or
measured, output is supply determined, we can use data in Table 2 to check whether evidence
is consistent with this prediction. To do so, we first test to see if the occurrences of
10
]0du&0dY[ tt >>  and ]0du&0dY[ tt <<  reported in that table occur randomly or
systematically throughout the sample.  At the very least, for the relationship between Y and u
described above to be consistent with the data, we will have to find that the above sign
combinations for the change output and unemployment occur systematically throughout the
sample.  Random occurrences of ]0du&0dY[ tt >>  and ]0du&0dY[ tt <<  on the other
hand might be consistent with a number of alternative explanations, e.g. creative destruction,
exogenous increase the labour force participation, or the net result of simultaneous exogenous
shocks to aggregate supply and demand.  However, none of these alternatives are capable of
explaining systematic occurrences of the above phenomena. We conduct this check
statistically using a ‘runs test’, which is a one-sample nonparametric test for randomness in a
dichotomous variable7.
Table 3: Runs Tests for the occurrences of
[dYt>0 & dut>0] and [dYt<0 & dut<0] Cases
Country T.V. Cases < T.V. Cases ≥T.V. Total
Cases
No. of
Runs
T.S.V. A .S.
BEL 0.417 88 63 151 25 -8.301 0.000
DEU 0.345 78 41 119 43 -2.397 0.017
ESP 0.480 79 73 152 47 -4.871 0.000
FRA 0.553 59 73 132 50 -2.874 0.004
GBR 0.370 97 57 154 58 -2.568 0.010
IRE 0.430 86 65 151 29 -7.668 0.000
ITA 0.513 75 79 154 76 -0.315 0.753
NLD 0.400 69 46 115 35 -4.138 0.000
PRT 0.629 56 95 151 42 -5.158 0.000
SWE 0.357 99 55 154 62 -1.711 0.087
T.V. is the Test value (mean cut point); T.S.V. is the value of the test statistic; A.S. is the 2-tailed
asymptotic significance level.
The bolded rows in Table 3 indicate the countries (i.e. Italy and Sweden) for which we
are unable to reject the null hypothesis of randomness in the runs.  Accordingly, these
countries are excluded from further analysis which will focus on the specific prediction
arising from Figure 1, i.e. unemployment and output are positively related when
unemployment is low and inversely related when unemployment is high.  Given that it is
                                                
7
  In this test we assign 1 to those periods where [dYt>0 & dut>0] and [dYt<0 & dut<0] and 0 to all other
periods. A run is defined as any sequence of cases having the same value. The total number of runs in a sample
is a measure of randomness in the order of the cases. Too many or too few runs can suggest a non-random or
dependent ordering.
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impossible to robustly estimate the underlying structural model generating the relationship in
Figure 1 – since, for example, the model contains a number of unobservable variables – and
because of the well-known specification and identification problems associated with
estimating the simple bi-variate reduced form depicted in Figure 1, we opt to simply compare
summary measures of central tendency of the unemployment rate across the two different
states set out in Table 2.  According to Figure 1, u should be low in state 1 and high in state 0,
recalling that these states correspond, to ]0du&0dY[ tt >>  and ]0du&0dY[ tt << , and
]0du&0dY[ tt <>  and ]0du&0dY[ tt >< , respectively.  These simple comparisons are
reported in Table 4.
Table 4: Comparing Mean and Median Unemployment Rates for the
Periods when Y and u are positively and negatively related
C
o
u
ntry
Mean for
State 1
Periods
Mean for
State 0
Periods
Difference
Between
Means
Median for
State 1
Periods
Median for
State 0
Periods
Difference
between
Medians
BEL 6.655 7.345 -0.689 7.066 8.847 -1.781
DEU 3.503 3.267 0.236 3.246 2.909 0.337
ESP 10.436 11.684 -1.248 7.603 15.351 -7.748
FRA 6.285 7.609 -1.323 5.661 9.002 -3.341
GBR 5.615 5.803 -0.187 4.419 5.914 -1.495
IRE 9.350 9.611 -0.261 7.765 8.310 -0.545
NLD 4.911 5.965 -1.054 4.071 5.856 -1.785
PRT 5.962 6.789 -0.828 5.593 7.106 -1.513
The results in Table 4 provide clear support for the prediction that states 0 and 1 are
likely to occur at high and low levels of unemployment, respectively; with the exception of
German data, the evidence shows a clear tendency for unemployment to be lower when
output and unemployment are positively related and higher when they are negatively related.
Thus, of the 10 European countries examined only Italy, Sweden and Germany do not match
this prediction, even though as seen in Table 2 that they have a significant number of
occurrences of output and unemployment moving in the same direction8.
                                                
8
  This discrepancy may be due to the differences in the way labour markets function in these countries, e.g. use
of guest labour, style of unionisation etc.. However, further investigation of these results is beyond the scope
of this paper since we are not attempting to empirically establish the general validity of the theory.  In contrast,
our primary purpose is to determine the theoretical conditions under which market imperfections pose serious
obstacles to welfare-improving stabilization policies and secondarily to check if any of the countries in our
sample have cause for concern.  Based on the simple data analysis presented in Section 2 we conclude that
Lindbeck’s reservations regarding the effectiveness of policy interventions have at least prima facia empirical
support for a number of European countries.
12
To construct the aggregate supply locus in (Y,P) space, we next examine how output
responds to changes in the price level.  To this end, we can first use L=1–-u to re-write (13)
as follows
du
du
dw
w
u
u
u11wdY 

 



 −
−−= .           (13’)
Using (10) and recalling that b=B/P and hence dP
P
Bdb 2 


−= , we obtain
du B
P
e
e
dPb
u
= −



 −
′
′



2 ,            (14)
which shows the trade-off between the price level and unemployment rate that results from
firms’ optimising behaviour in the presence of an exogenously determined reservation wage,
B.  Upon substitution for du from (14) in (13') we have


 



 −
−



′
′
−


=
du
dw
w
u
u
u11
e
e
P
wB
dP
dY
u
b
2 .            (15)
Given the discussion above regarding the sign of dY/dL, the right-hand-side of equation (15)
implies that the sign of dY/dP changes from positive to negative as the level of output reaches
YY = , which is the level corresponding to the maximum supply that the economy can reach
as illustrated in Figure 1.  Thus, the aggregate supply, AS, locus in (Y, P) is upward sloping
initially as Y rises, but then bends backward and output supply falls as price rises.  This is
shown in Figure 2 where we sketch the derivation of AS by combining:  i) the equilibrium
relationship in (12) depicted in Figure 1 now drawn in the bottom right quarter; ii) the trade-
off between the price level and unemployment rate in (13') which, for convenience, is
approximated by a straight line in the top left quarter; and iii) the labour force restriction
L+u=1 which is drawn in the bottom left quarter.  Those combinations of P and Y which
satisfy these three relationships are then traced by dotted lines to the  (Y, P) space in the top
right quarter of Figure 2 to construct the aggregate supply curve which bends back at Y
where output reaches its maximum as unemployment rate approaches u .
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 Figure 2. The Backward-Bending Aggregate Supply Curve
                                                                             P
                                                                                                                                AS
                                                                        P
         
            Equation (13’)
   u                                       u                              0                                                              Y   Y
                          L+u=1
                                                                            L
                                                                                 L                                          Equation (12)
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3. Government, Households and Aggregate Demand
Government consumption consists of a CES bundle of the differentiated varieties produced in
the economy as explained in (2), and the corresponding expenditure is
( ) PGdjgP
Nj
jj =∫
∈
.            (16)
The government expenditure consists of (16) and the unemployment benefit payments B per
unemployed. This expenditure is financed by a lump sum tax9, T, which, together with the
normalisation of the number of households to unity – on the assumption that each household
is endowed with one unit of labour – gives rise to the following budget constraint
PG + uB = T.            (17)
Each household supplies, inelastically, its unit of labour and at any point in time it can
either be employed or be unemployed.  When employed, a typical household works for a firm
j, supplying the effort level ej>0 and earning nominal wage Wj.  If unemployed, it receives
from the government the nominal unemployment benefit B at no effort.  Dropping the
distinction between firms and recalling that: i) the normalisation of the number of households
to unity implies L+u=1; ii) profits are eliminated through a free entry and exit process, the
‘expected’ household income is given by (1-u)W+uB and its budget constraint is
TMuBW)u1(MPC −++−=+ ,            (18)
where M is the desired stock of money, M  is the existing money stock, T is the lump-sum
tax, and C and P are the CES quantity and price indices described by equations (2) and (3),
respectively10.  Household’s utility is defined as a Cobb-Douglas function of C and 
P
M
                                                
9
  The use of a lump-sum tax is a common simplification in the literature. For further explanations see Molana
and Moutos (1992), Heijdra and Van der Ploeg (1996) and Heijdra, et al. (1998) among others.
10
 Note that ( )∫
∈
=
Nj
jj djcPPC  where jP  is price of the jth variety, the demand for which is






=
−
n
C
P
P
c
j
j
ε
.
15
α
α
−



=

 1
P
MC
P
M
,Cu ,            (19)
implying the following consumption and money demand equations11,


 −++−
=
P
TMuBW)u1(C α ,            (20)
and


 −++−
−=
P
TMuBW)u1()1(
P
M
α .            (21)
Given the above, the aggregate demand, AD, can be derived as follows.  Imposing the
money market equilibrium by setting M M= , (20) and (21) imply C M
P
=
−




α
α1
, which
can be substituted into the aggregate demand Y = C+G to yield
Y G M
P
= +
−




α
α1
.            (22)
4. Goods Market in General Equilibrium
We can now study the general equilibrium properties of the economy described above by
focusing on the goods market equilibrium and examining how the AD and AS curves interact
in (Y, P) space. This is shown in Figure 3 in which AS is re-plotted as derived in Figure 2 and
the curves labelled AD, AD’ and AD’’ show three possible graphs of (22).
First, consider AD, which captures the familiar situation since a unique and stable
equilibrium labelled E emerges where AS is upward sloping.  A small expansionary demand
shock will shift AD to the right and the new equilibrium will therefore be associated with
higher levels of output, employment and price. It can be easily verified that the balanced
budget fiscal multiplier in this situation is positive but less than unity (see below).
                                                
11
 For simplicity, like most studies we assume complete separation between households’ and government’s
consumption. Therefore, government consumption does not appear in household’s utility function. For some
exceptions see, for example, Molana and Moutos (1989), Heijdra et al (1998) and Reinhorn (1998) who
extend the original results by allowing for some substitution between the public and private consumption.
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Figure 3. Goods Market in General Equilibrium
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Next consider AD’ which gives rise to two equilibria labelled E’1 and E’2.  While E’1
has the conventional attributes as E above, E’2 is unstable and occurs where AS is downward
sloping.  Compared to E’1, E’2 corresponds to a lower level of output, a higher price level, and
a considerably lower level of unemployment.  Clearly, E’2 is not an equilibrium that will ever
be selected by efficient market forces.  Nevertheless, its existence suggests that, given
suitable policy instruments, the pursuit of full employment policies could in fact entrap the
economy in such an inefficient and unstable equilibrium.  It is also interesting to note that,
disregarding the instability problem, the balanced budget fiscal output multiplier in this
situation exceeds unity; output rises more than proportionally but employment falls!  This
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apparently counter-intuitive result occurs because the economy at E’2 is inefficient and suffers
from what one may call hidden unemployment where labour is rather unproductive.
Now, consider the situation portrayed by AD’’ which has a unique intersection with
AS at E’’ that occurs where AS is downward sloping.  While the slopes of AD’’ and AS are
such that E’’ is stable, it is nevertheless important to note that this is an inefficient
equilibrium since the same level of output could be produced at a considerably lower level of
employment.  Moreover, in this situation an expansionary fiscal shock which shifts AD’’ to
the right raises the price level and employment but reduces output!  This outcome could be
explained as follows. The exogenous increase in demand initially raises prices and results in
positive profits, which induces new entry that continues until profits are wiped out.  But as
the new entrants’ hire workers the falling unemployment begins to show its impact on labour
productivity, which results in losses and induces the loss making firms to exit. The process
continues until a new equilibrium is achieved in which a smaller number of firms operate in a
relatively inefficient environment where labour productivity is relatively low.
Finally, the fiscal multiplier mentioned above can be expressed as 1/(1-R) where R is
the ratio of slope of AD to that of AS at the initial equilibrium point.  To see this, use the
above explanation underlying the AS and AD to write
AS: Y Y Ps= ( )
AD: Y G Y Pd= + ( )
Totally differentiating these and eliminating dP yields
dY
dG Y P
Y P
d
s
=
−
′
′
1
1 ( )
( )
.            (23)
Equation (23) clearly shows how the size and sign of the multiplier is determined by the
relative slopes of the AS and AD curves.
6. Summary and Conclusions
The main purpose of this paper has been to determine the theoretical conditions under which
market imperfections pose serious obstacles to welfare-improving stabilization policies.  To
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this end we have constructed a stylised general equilibrium model, consisting of price setting
monopolistically competitive firms which offer efficiency wages, to show that demand led
expansions may have a variety of expected and unexpected effects when market
imperfections lead to changes in labour productivity.   The interaction of the aggregate
demand and supply functions derived in this model clearly show that, in principle, different
types of equilibria could emerge including multiple equilibria.  The main distinction between
these equilibria, apart from their stability properties, relates to the level of labour productivity.
This delineation has enabled us to rank the equilibria as ‘efficient’ and ‘inefficient’ and using
these rankings we have shown that an exogenous stimulation of aggregate demand can only
raise output and reduce unemployment provided the economy is operating relatively
efficiently.  However, when an economy is trapped in an inefficient equilibrium, we have
shown that positive demand shocks can lead, perversely, to an increase in unemployment.
Additionally, based on the stylised facts regarding the co-movement of output and
unemployment changes from a number of European countries, we have also shown that – in
contrast to most of the current theoretical literature – the model developed in this paper is
capable of reproducing the observed movements in the data (i.e. unemployment changes and
output changes can be either positively or negatively related).  Moreover, our simple data
analysis suggested that, for most of the European countries in our sample, there was a clear
tendency for unemployment to be lower when output and unemployment were positively
related and higher when they were negatively related.
In conclusion, we hope that the analysis and empirical evidence provided in this paper
have shed light on the importance of having reservations about the effectiveness of policy
interventions in the face of market imperfections and lend support to the concerns expressed
in Lindbeck (1992).
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Appendix: Derivation of the Effort Supply Function e(w,u,b)
This appendix explains how a specific effort supply function such as that in equation (6)
can be derived within the framework of the Efficiency Wage Hypothesis. As explained in
Section 2, equation (6) could in fact be derived by maximising a suitably constructed
function which describes a household’s preferences for employment and effort. We denote
this by v(e) and assumed that: i) agents associate a positive level of utility with being
employed; ii) the level of utility attached to employement is higher, the larger is the
unemployment rate in the economy; and iii) while agents dislike effort and would like to
reduce it as much as possible, doing so will raise the probability of losing their job due to
shirking. Using these, we explain our derivation of an effort supply function such as
equation (6) in a number of stages.
In stage 1, we define the probabilities associated with moving from one state to another:
f:  probability associated with being fired when shirking.
We assume that shirking is the only reason for being fired. Therefore, ceteris paribus, f
is a monotonic function of the effort level, e. Thus, f = f(e); f(0) = 1; f(1) = 0; and f′ <0.
For simplicity, we let  f(e) = 1 – e.
h: probability associated with finding a job, or being hired, when unemployed.
We assume that the labour force is homogeneous and, ceteris paribus, h is a monotonic
function of the unemployment rate, u. Thus, h h u h h h= ≤ = ′ <( ), ( ) , ( ) ,0 1 1 0 0 .
For simplicity we let h(u) = 1 – u .
In stage 2, we define the utility indices corresponding to being in each state:
VH: utility of being hired (or finding a job)
VE: utility of being in employment (or working)
VF: utility of being fired (or losing one’s job)
VU: utility of being unemployed
In stage 3, we explain how the above utility indices are determined, and use them to
construct the subutility v(e).
i) We use VU as our benchmark and let VU = b, where b is the real value of the
reservation wage, or in our model the unemployment benefit, b=B/P.
ii) We assume that a potential worker prefers finding a job (or being hired) to
remaining unemployed. The simplest way to implement this assumption is to let VH
=βVU, β>1. Adding a further assumption that the relative satisfaction of finding a
job is higher the larger is the extent of unemployment, implies
β β β β β= > ′ > ′′ <( ), ( ) , ,u 0 1 0 0 .
iii) We construct VE using the standard idea that the utility from working is
proportional to the real wage w=W/P earned which ought to be adjusted for the
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disutility of effort. Thus, we let VE =γw-ke2 where γ≥1 is a factor scaling income
from work, k>0 is a constant parameter and the disutilty of effort is assumed to rise
at an increasing rate. Now, adding a further assumption that the marginal utility of
income from employment is higher the larger is the extent of unemployment,
implies γ γ γ γ γ= = ′ > ′′ <( ), ( ) , ,u 0 1 0 0 . To keep notation simple we adopt
the normalisation β=1+γ.
iv) Given that a ‘fired’ worker can either be hired or remain unemployed, we let VF be
a weighted average of VH  and  VU. Thus, VF = hVH + (1-h)VU.
v) Finally, given that v(e) is, by definition,  the ‘expected utility’ of remaining in
employment, we let v(e) = (1-f)VE + fVF.
Based on the above explanations, we obtain,
v e e w ke e u b ub( ) ( ) ( )( )= − + − − + +γ γ2 1 1 1
    .
The agent takes (w,u,b) as given and chooses e to maximise v(e), the first order
condition for which is
− + − − + + =3 1 1 02ke w u b ubγ γ( )( )  .
Letting δ    γ  and using normalisation k=1/3, we obtain an explicit
functional form for equation (6), namely e w b= −γ δ 1 2/ . While it is clear that ′ >ew 0 and
′ <eb 0  always hold, the sign of ′ =



 − − ′ +e e w u b bu
1
2
1[ ( ) ]γ γ   is not readily determined.
But it can be seen that ′ >eu 0  is also satisfied since  γ ’ >0  and  w>(1-u)b holds. It is also
easy to verify that ′′ = <e e
w
ww
∂
∂
2
2 0 , ′′ = >e
e
w bwb
∂
∂ ∂
2
0  and ′′ = <e e
w u
wu
∂
∂ ∂
2
0  hold and the
condition ′
′
−
′′
′′
<
e
e
e
e
u
b
wu
wb
0  is satisfied which implies dw/du obtained in (11) is positive, as
required.
